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LABOR LAW - UNION DISCIPLINE - MEMBERS WHO VIOLATE UNION BY-LAWS
BY CROSSING LAWFUL PICKET LINES ARE SUBJECT TO COURT-ENFORCED
FINES. N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 87 Sup.Ct. 2001
(1967).
In compliance with the union constitution, lawful strikes
were called against Allis-Chalmers by two locals of the U.A.W.
During the strikes, members of each local crossed and worked be-
hind the picket line. After the strikes these employees were
charged with "conduct unbecoming a union member"; and, after an
adversary proceeding conducted by the local's trial committee
were found guilty and fined sums ranging from $20 to $100.1
Some of the members paid the fine while others refused. The
union sued to collect the fines in state court and recovered
judgment upon the contract theory that the employee by joining
the union assumed the duties of membership as outlined in the
union constitution.
Allis-Chalmers filed unfair labor practice charges against
the locals alleging violtion of Section 8(b)(i)(A) of the Labor
Management Relations Act' in that the levying of court-enforced
fines "restrained and coerced" the employees in their exercise
of the statutory right to engage in or refrain from concerted
activities as protected by Section 7 of the Act. 3
The N.L.R.B. viewed the case4 as a conflict between Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) which protects EMPLOYEES in the exercise of their
statutory rights, and its proviso5 which defines plenary union
1. The International Union's Constitution and by-laws permit-
ted levying these fines for each day's violation. Local 248,
United Automobile, Aerospace, Etc., 149 N.L.R.B. 67, 68, 57 L.R.
R.M. 1242 (1964).
2. Section 8(b). "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents - (1) to restrain or coerce
(A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right
of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect
to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; ... 
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §8(b)(l)(A),
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(1)(A) (1952).
3. Section 7: "Employees shall have the right to . . . engage
in . . . concerted activities . . . and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all such activities . . . ." Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §7, 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. Section 157 (1952).
4. Local 248, United Automobile, Aerospace, Etc., 149 N.L.R.B.
67, 57 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1964).
5. Supra, note 2.
power over UNION MEMBERS. The majority saw the union's action
in fining the disobedient members as a legitimate exercise of
power over its internal affairs, and thus falling within the pro-
tection of the proviso.6  They reasoned that Section 7 rights
could be and were waived by the employee's voluntary act of join-
ing the union.7 Such act changed his status from that of an em-
ployee enjoying the right to refrain from concerted activities,
to that of a union member subject to union authority. The dis-
sent, on the other hand, viewed fining as falling outside the
proviso, thereby receiving the protection of Section 8(b)(l)(A).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 8 reversed the Board
holding that although the union had the statutory right to expel
dissident members, the use of any other means of discipline,
such as fining, amounted to coercion in violation of Section
8(b)(l)(A).9 The employee, the court said, does not waive his
6. The Board quoted cases holding that §8(b) (1) (A) does not
prohibit union disciplinary sanctions that are neither tinged
with violence nor directed at employment status, the later being
a violation of §8(b)(2). See Minneapolis Star and Tribune Com-
pany, 109 N.L.R.B. 727, 738, 34 L.R.R.M. 1431 (1954); Interna-
tional Typographical Union, 86 N.L.R.B. 951, 956-957, 1022-1023,
25 L.R.R.M. 1052 (1949); Local 283, United Automobile, Aircraft,
Etc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 55 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1964); United Steel
Workers of America, Local No. 4028, 154 N.L.R.B. 692, 60 L.R.R.
M. 1008 (1965); N.L.R.B. v. International Union, United A., A.
& A. I. Wkrs., 320 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1963); Machinists v. Gon-
zales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958).
7. "Neither §7 nor any other provision . . . grants assurance
that the employee thus choosing to refrain shall be relieved of
duties and obligations undertaken as a consequence of his ac-
quisition or retention of membership in a labor organization."
Local 248, United Automobile, Aerospace, Etc., 149 N.L.R.B. 67,
57 L.R.R.M. 1242, 1244 (1964). Accord, N.L.R.B. v. Internation-
al Union, United A., A. & A. I. Wkrs., 320 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.
1963).
8. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.
1966).
9. Cf. With respect to union fines imposed upon employees who
refrained from a strike: "But to equate union fines with total
wages earned by a non-striking employee is the grossest form of
economic coercion affecting not only union membership status
but also the relationship between the employee and his employer
in violation of the Act. [8(b)(2)]. Such economic coercion is
calculated in design and effect to force an employee to act in
concert with the union in future labor-management strife. Con-
gress has imposed strict limitation on compulsory unionism, and
the Supreme Court has determined the obligation of union member-
ship to be confined solely to the payment of dues." Leeds &
Northrup Co. v. N.L.R.B., 357 F.2d 527, 536 (3d Cir. 1966).
statutory Section 7 rights when he becomes a member of the
union.
Before this case the law was unclear with respect to the
power of unions to levy fines upon its members. If the union
attempted to prevent defecting members from crossing picket
lines by threatening them with "physical" harm or if it inter-
fered with their employment relationship the union violated
Section 8(b)(l)(A).lU There was, however, no prohibition on
the union's right to expel a dissident member1i and the unions
have long argued that the lesser sanction of fining was neces-
sary to insure majority rule.12 But there has been long stand-
ing opposition to this argument. 1
3
10. E.g. Progressive Mine Workers v. N.L.R.B., 187 F.2d 298
(7th Cir. 1951); N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235
(2d Cir. 1953); Fox Midwest Amusement Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 699,
717-719, 29 L.R.R.M. 1414 (1952); Minneapolis Star and Tribune
Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727, 34 L.R.R.M. 1431 (1954). Many sources
today argue the inclusion of "economic violence" under the def-
inition of physical violence since the effect is often the same.
Leeds & Northrup Co. v. N.L.R.B., 357 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1966).
11.' There was authority for the proposition that when a union
decided not to strike or entered into a no-strike agreement a
dissident minority was not free by virtue of its §7 rights to
ignore that decision and strike on its own. See e.g., N.L.R.B.
v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944); Parks v. I.B.E.W.,
314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963);
N.L.R.B. v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939); Labor Board v.
Rockaway News Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953). Likewise, unions argued
in the instant case, if a union decides to strike, members may
not refuse. Contra, Mastro Plastics Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 350
U.S. 270, 280 (1956).
12. The argument usually runs that Congress, which permitted
the Union to expel members, certainly would not prohibit the
sanction of fining which has less severe effects. See, e.g.,
N.L.R.B. v. Amalgamated Local 286, 222 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1955);
Rubens v. Weber, 260 N.Y.S. 701, 237 App. Div. 15 (1932); Cox,
The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev.
609, 612, 622-633 (1958-59); Summers, Disciplinary Procedures
of Unions, 4 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 15, 26 (1950-51); Summers,
Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049
(1950-51).
13. Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Re-
form Act of 1959, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 830 (1960), . . . "Pre-
serving democracy requires protecting individual and minorities
against numerical majorities or an officialdom which acts with
the majority's consent. It is not enough to put our trust in
self-restraint." See, §8(b)(i)(A) Limitations Upon the Right
of a Union to Fine Its Members, 115 U. of Penn. L. Rev. 47,
61-63 (1966).
Proceeding on petition for review of an order of the N.L.
R.B.'s dismissal and the court's reversal, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. In June, 1967, the Supreme Court heldl4
that a union which fines its members for crossing its lawful
picket line and attempts to collect such fines by suit or
threat of suit in a state court does not commit an unfair la-
bor practice in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). Such fining
does not "restrain or coerce" employees in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A)--because the employee waived his statutory Section
7 rights when he voluntarily became a union member. There was
a vigorous four judge dissent which felt that these rights were
intended by Congress to be absolute and non-waivable.
The principal reason behind the court's decision was the
assumption that the institution of "unionism" would be destroyed
if minority members possess power to defy the majority in the
crucial use of concerted activities, especially with regard to
the weaker unions. Expulsion power was not sufficient because
where the union is weak and membership therefore of little val-
ue, the union faced with further depletion has no real choice
except to condone the members' disobedience. "It is just such
weak unions for which the power to execute union decisions taken
for the benefit of all employees is most critical to effective
discharge of its statutory policy."
1 5
The Supreme Court by upholding the right of the group to
use the legal process to enforce its discipline over dissident
members will clearly strengthen unionism, but it is submitted
that the court is overlooking the rights and dignity of the now
obscure member who is economically coerced into obeying union
directives. By associating, which is often motivated by econom-
ic necessity, the individual may well be forced to surrender
matters of conscience, belief or expression, or alternatively be
subject to court-enforced union fines. The court viewed the
union as a private government " ... with powers comparable to
those possessed by a legislative body both to create and re-
strict the rights of those whom he [the bargaining representa-
tive] represents."'1 6  It may even bargain away his right to
strike and his right to cross a lawful picket line.
14. N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 2001
(1967).
15. The majority's assumption that unions would collapse with-
out the availability of the fining sanction appears unsupported
by empirical data or sound reasoning. The dissent, using the
same history, reaches the opposite result with equal facility.
N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., supra note 14, at 2008.
16. N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 2001,
2006 (1967), quoting Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S.
192, 202 (1944).
Thus the employee by joining a union loses many of those
rights which he had before becoming affiliated. The court sug-
gests the reason is because the majority rule concept is today
unquestionably at the center of our federal labor policy.
1 7
This policy extinguishes the individual employee's power to or-
der his own relations with his employer and creates a power
vested in the chosen representative to act in the interest of
all employees.
The court, narrowly construing Section 8(b)(1)(A), inter-
preted Congressional intent in using the "inherently imprecise
words restrain or coerce" as excluding union members from its
umbrella of protection. This permitted the union to discipline
its members by fining, which was seen as a legitimate exercise
of power over internal union affairs, as was granted in the
proviso. In justifying the limited protection of Section 8(b)
(1)(A) to only those in the employee.status, the court charac-
terizes the union-member relationship as one established by
contract principles with employee rights being voluntarily
"waived". Such notion widely prevails in this country with
the courts' only role being to enforce the contract. 1 8
The dissent, by Justice Black,1 9 envisioned far reaching
effects of this practice of fining which, if not checked, would
permit the union to economically invade the personality of each
member and substitute its will for the member's. He would broad-
ly interpret Section 8(b)(l)(A) to protect union as well as non-
union employees from coercive union tactics. This would leave
workers free to determine whether or not to engage in concerted
labor activities unhampered by pressures of employers or unions.
The dissent goes on to say that Section 7 rights are absolute
and not waived by an employee when he assumes the status of a
union member.
The dissent recognized the impropriety and the threat to
freedom presented by the court's approval of the government-
like function over its members. Justice Black stated that "it
is one thing to say that Congress did not wish to interfere
with the union's power to prescribe conditions of membership
but quite another thing to say that Congress intended to leave
unions free to exercise a court-like power to try and punish
17. See Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation:
Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L. J. 1327,
1333 (1957-58).
18. See Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts
Do in Fact, 70 Yale L. J. 175, 180.(1960-61).
19. Justice Black was joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan and
Stewart.
members with a direct economic sanction for exercising this
right to work."
20
The majority opinion was supported by three justices, as
was the dissent. The rule of law was "crystallized" when Jus-
tice White concurred and stated that coercive union rules are
enforceable at least by expulsion, never commenting on the
fines. He concluded that the majority opinion is the more per-
suasive and sensible construction of the statute, although he
stated, "I am doubtful about the implications of some of its
generalized statements."21
The implications of this case are indeed far reaching.
Today institutions, such as unions, have displaced much of the
government's functions in exercising control and sanctions
over individuals. However, thus far they have failed to rec-
ognize that responsibility must follow power if there is to be
a free society.2 2  The power of the group over the individual
must be restrained or tyranny of the majority will be a devas-
tating reality. The Supreme Court jealously guards the rights
embodied in the Bill of Rights, but this case suggests that
those cherished civil rights protecting the human personality
from governmental invasion are being sacrificed on the econom-
ic front. These same rights upon which are grounded the es-
sentials of human dignity including freedom of choice and free-
dom from coercion are being contracted away to the institution
which results in a not so subtle form of economic servitude.
To protect these rights the court must recognize that 19th
century contract principles are no longer an effective means of
protecting individual liberties. Only by ascribing non-waiv-
able rights and duties to an individual's status can the indi-
vidual be protected from coercion resulting from contracts of
adhesion. This would place a cloak of protection about the
individual which no superior bargaining force could penetrate
nor cause to be contracted away.
Sometimes because of a value judgment a man may hold moral
or pragmatic considerations higher than his group membership.
If he has chosen to be in the employee status -- even though he
faces union expulsion -- the Section 7 rights ascribed to that
status should be protected by Section 8(b)(i)(A). When faced
with possible expulsion the employee can then choose whether he
20. N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 2001,
2018 (1967).
21. Id. at 2016.
22. See generally, Affeldt, The Independent Labor Union and
the Good Life, 35 George Washington L. Rev. 869, 906 (1967);
Affeldt, The Right of Association and Labor Law, 7 Villanova
L. Rev. 27 (1961).
values his union membership more than he values his right to
work. But when faced with enforceable threats of financial
sanctions far greater than his total earnings, if he exercise
his right to work, all reasonable freedom of choice is fore-
closed and the employee is compelled to bend to the union dic-
tates.
The court had at its disposal the means to protect ALL
workers, employees and union members, by broadly interpreting
Section 8(b)(i)(A). By failing to do so they have severely
limited the individual's right to dissent and his freedom of
choice.
RONALD C. BROWN
